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Re-examining the law and economics of the business
judgment rule: notes for its implementation in non-
US jurisdictions
Aurelio Gurrea-Martínez
Harvard Law School, Program on International Financial Systems, Cambridge, MA, USA
ABSTRACT
The business judgment rule, as it has been traditionally understood, seems to be
based on three underlying assumptions that make this rule economically
desirable. First, directors are subject to a credible threat of being sued for a
breach of the duty of care. Second, the primary role of the corporation is to
maximise shareholder value. Third, shareholders want the directors to pursue
those investment projects with the highest net present value regardless of
their volatility. This article challenges these assumptions and argues that the
business judgment rule might not be desirable in some jurisdictions outside
the United States and even in many US corporations. Moreover, it points out
that the implementation of the business judgment rule may actually create
new, unintended costs. By re-examining the law and economics of the
business judgment, this article draws conclusions about the most efficient
way to implement the business judgment rule across jurisdictions.
ARTICLE HISTORY Received 13 March 2017; Accepted 24 November 2017
1. Introduction
Several countries have implemented, or are planning to implement, the
business judgment rule as a way to improve their corporate governance prac-
tices. In this article, I seek to assess whether the implementation of the
business judgment rule is economically desirable and, if so, how it should
be implemented in a particular jurisdiction. The article is divided as follows.
Section 2 analyses the origins and transplantation of the business judgment
rule from the United States to other legal systems. Section 3 seeks to
explain the ‘traditional’ law and economics of the business judgment rule,
in order to understand the rationale behind the protection of managers in
their business decisions. Section 4 re-examines the law and economics of
the business judgment rule by both challenging some of its underlying
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assumptions and pointing out other weaknesses of the rule. Section 5 dis-
cusses the most efficient way to implement (if so) the business judgment
rule in non-US jurisdictions. Section 6 concludes with a summary of policy
considerations about the possible implementation of the business judgment
rule across jurisdictions.
2. The origins and transplantation of the business judgment
rule
The business judgment rule has been classified as one of corporate law’s
central doctrines.1 This rule prevents judges from second-guessing business
decisions made by corporate directors and (depending on the jurisdiction)
executive officers, provided that some requirements are met – usually,
making a business decision in good faith, with no conflict of interests, with
a reasonable level of information, and in the best interest of the corporation.
This doctrine finds its earliest expression in the first half of the nineteenth
century in the United States.2 In a well-known decision,3 the Supreme Court of
Louisiana decided to protect the managers in a business decision made in
good faith and with no conflict of interests.4 According to the court’s view,
it is irrelevant whether a business decision may end up being a failure or
success. Courts should just focus on how the decision was made. Otherwise,
if the court focused on the outcome instead of the process in which the
decision was made, honest and qualified people would be discouraged
from acting as corporate directors; or if so, they would not take any risk,
they would require a higher pay, or the company would have to pay a
higher insurance premium. In all of these scenarios, value would be destroyed
for the shareholders and society as a whole.5
This decision was followed by other courts in the United States,6 and, more
recently, by other countries.7 Nevertheless, and even though the rationale
behind this rule is quite similar, the way the business judgment rule has
1See Stephen M. Bainbridge, ‘The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine’ [2004] 57 Vanderbilt
Law Review 83.
2S. Samuel Arsht, ‘The Business Judgment Rule Revisited’ [1979] 8 Hofstra Law Review 93, 97
3The first application of the business judgment is usually associated with Percy v Millaudon, a case decided
by the Supreme Court of Louisiana in 1829.
4Unless otherwise is stated, this paper will use the terms ‘managers’ and ‘directors’ as synonyms.
5Arguing that investors’ wealth would decrease if the managers were subjected to a strict scrutiny by
courts, see Frank. H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law
(Harvard University Press 1991) 93.
6See Godbold v. Branch Bank, a case decided by the Supreme Court of Alabama in 1847.
7Just to mention various cases, Australia adapted the business judgment rule as a statutory rule in 2000 in
the section 180(2) of the Corporations Act. For an empirical analysis of the implementation of the business
judgment rule in Australia, see Jenifer Varzaly, ‘Protecting the Authority of Directors: An Empirical Analysis
of the Statutory Business Judgment Rule’ [2012] 12 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 429. In Brazil, the
business judgment rule seems to be implicitly recognised in the article 159 § 6.° of the Corporations Act
enacted in 1976. See the resolutions of the Brazilian Stock Exchange Commission No 25/2003, 21/2004,
and 24/2006. For a more detailed analysis of civil liability of directors and the business judgment rule
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been implemented differs across jurisdictions.8 On the one hand, there are jur-
isdictions where the business judgment rule has been adopted as a non-stat-
utory rule either in a soft or a strong manner.9 On the other hand, there are
under Brazilian Law, see also Mariana Pargendler, ‘Responsabilidade Civil dos Administradores e Business
Judgment Rule no Direito Brasileiro’ [2015] 953 Revista do Tribunais 51. In Colombia, even though a kind
of ‘soft’ business judgment rule seems to be recognised under the duty of acting as a ‘good business man’
(see, for example, the Resolution of the Superintendence of Companies No 2014-801-054), the business
judgment rule was proposed to be codified in 2015. See http://www.supersociedades.gov.co/noticias/
Documents/2015/Septiembre/Libro%20proyecto%20de%20reforma.pdf. Germany incorporated the
business judgment rule as a codified rule in 2005 in section 93 (1) para. 2 AktG. However, the rule
seems to be applied since ARAG/Garmenbeck was decided in 1997. For an analysis of the business judg-
ment rule in Germany, see Markus Roth, ‘Corporate Boards in Germany’, in Paul Davies, Klaus Hopt,
Richard Nowak and Gerard van Solinge (eds.) Corporate Boards in Law and Practice: A Comparative Analy-
sis in Europe (Oxford University Press 2013) 321–2. In Italy, a kind of ‘soft’ business judgment rule seems
be applied under the doctrine of the ‘immunity of business decisions’ (see the decision of the Supreme
Court of Italy on 24 March 2004). For further analysis, see Gian Giacomo Peruzzo, Business judgment rule e
responsabilità degli amministratori di S.p.A (Aracne, 2016); Danilo Semeghini, ‘Il dibattito statunitense sulla
business judgment rule: spunti per una rivisitazione del tema’ [2013] 2 Rivista di Diritto Societario 206;
Bartolomeo Quatraro and Emilio Tossi, Il controllo giudiziario delle società (Giuffrè 1997) 12. In Japan, even
though the business judgment rule seems to be recognised by both courts and academics, it was
expressly applied in Apamanshop, a case decided by the Supreme Court of Japan on 15 July 2010. For
an analysis of this case, and the business judgment rule in Japan, see Dan W. Puchniak and Masafumi
Nakahigashi, Corporate Law, Business Judgment Rule – Derivative Action – Supreme Court 15 July 2010
– ‘Apamanshop’ with comment, in Moritz Bälz et al (eds.), Business Law in Japan: Cases and Comments
(Wolters Kluwer 2012) 215–26; Tomotaka Fujita, ‘Revising the managerial liability regime in Japan’, in
Hideki Kanda, Kon Sim-Kim and Curtis J. Milhaupt (eds.) Transforming Corporate Governance in East
Asia (Routledge 2008) 28–30. In Spain, the business judgment rule was implemented as a statutory
rule in 2014. However, before its codification, Spanish courts already applied a ‘soft’ business judgment
rule. See Aurelio Gurrea-Martínez, ‘La cuestionada deseabilidad económica de la business judgment rule
en el Derecho español’ [2014] Working Paper, available at <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2445545> accessed on 12 January 2017. In the United Kingdom, a ‘soft’ non-statutory
business judgment rule seems to be applied since Howard Smith Ltd v Ampol Petroleum in 1974. See
Luca Enriques, Henry Hansmann, and Reinier Kraakman, ‘The Basic Governance Structure: The Interests
of Shareholders as a Class’, in Kraakman et al, The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and Func-
tional Approach (3rd edn, Oxford University Press 2009) 79–80. In the United States, a strong form of non-
statutory business judgment rule has been applied since Percy v Millaudon. For a detailed analysis of the
business judgment rule in the United States, see Dennis J. Block, Nancy E. Barton and Stephen A. Radin,
The business judgment rule: fiduciary duties of corporate directors (5th edn, Aspen Law & Business 2002).
For a detailed discussion about the nature and rationale of the business judgment rule in the United
States, see Melvin A. Eisenberg, ‘The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and Standards of Review in
Corporate Law’ [1993] 62 Fordham Law Review 437; William Allen, Reinier Kraakman and Guhan Subra-
manian, Commentaries and Cases on the Law of Business Organization (4th edn, Wolters Kluwer, 2011)
227–35; William Allen, ‘The Corporate Directors’ Fiduciary Duty of Care and the Business Judgment
Rule under US Corporate Law’, in Klaus Hopt, Hideki Kanda, Mark Roe, Eddy Wymmersch and Stefan
Prigge (eds.), Comparative Corporate Governance: The State of Art and Emerging Research (Oxford Univer-
sity Press 1998) 307–31; Bainbridge (n 1).
8Some authors have argued that the business judgment rule has been implemented at different levels
across jurisdictions. For instance, see Carlos Andrés Laguado Giraldo, ‘Factors Governing the Application
of the Business Judgment Rule: An Empirical Study of the US, UK, Australia and the EU’ [2006] 111 Vni-
versitas 115. In this paper, the author suggests several levels of application of the business judgment rule:
(i) low, when there is only an implied business judgment rule applied by courts; (ii) medium, when the
business judgment rule is strongly supported by courts; and (iii) high, when the business judgment rule
has been codified.
9Some examples of this ‘soft’ application of the business judgment rule can be found in the UK, Italy, or
Spain before 21 December 2014. Likewise, this soft interpretation of the business judgment rule also
seems to exist in Brazil and Japan. For Brazil, see Pargendler (n 7). For Japan, see Puchniak and Nakahi-
gashi (n 7) 215–26. The strong application of the business judgment rule as a non-statutory rule would be
exemplified in the law of the United States.
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jurisdictions where the business judgment rule has been implemented as a
codified rule, normally with the purpose of enhancing legal certainty.10 In
these latter jurisdictions, however, the business judgment rule has not been
adopted in the same way. For example, while some jurisdictions have
implemented the business judgment rule as a presumption in favour of cor-
porate directors – as it has been the traditional model followed by Delaware11
– other jurisdictions have implemented the rule as a ‘safe harbour’, so the
directors have to prove that they made the decision fulfiling certain require-
ments. Otherwise, they cannot get the protection of the business judgment
rule.12
3. The rationale for protecting managers in their business
decisions
3.1. Innovation, firm value, and managerial risk aversion
Most rewarding decisions in life imply risks. In business, the ability to take risks
not only may generate gains for the shareholders (‘microeconomic benefits of
risk’) but, more importantly, it can also promote innovation, entrepreneurship,
and development (‘macroeconomic benefits of risks’). In the context of a cor-
poration, three main factors may encourage shareholders to take risks. First, as
a result of limited liability, shareholders are not required to bear the potential
losses generated by a corporation. Their exposure is just limited to the total
amount invested in the company’s share capital. Second, shareholders
receive variable returns on their investment. Therefore, the more money the
company makes, the more cash-flows the shareholders will be entitled to
receive. Thus, while, due to limited liability, shareholders will be ‘hedged’
against the company’s downside, they will be able to get the gains associated
10See the memorandum of the Bill to amend the Corporation Act in 1998. Likewise, defending the codi-
fication of the business judgment rule in jurisdictions – such as California –where the business judgment
rule is not clearly supported by courts, see Melvin A. Eisenberg, Background Study for the California Law
Revision Commission on Whether the Business-Judgment Rule Should Be Codified (May 1995).
11This is the situation, for example, in Australia, where the business judgment rule seems to be a presump-
tion in favour of corporate directors (section 180(2) of the Australian Corporations Act 2001). The
business judgment as a presumption in the United States can be founded in Aronson v. Lewis
(Supreme Court of Delaware, 1984).
12In Germany, for example, the implementation of the business judgment rule has followed a different
approach. Unlike the United States (especially in Delaware), where the business judgment rule has
been traditionally understood as a presumption in favor of corporate directors, Germany understands
the business judgment rule as a ‘safe harbour’ for directors. Therefore, while the United States
imposes the burden of proof on the plaintiff, Germany imposes the burden of proof on the directors.
See Roth, ‘Corporate Boards in Germany’ in Paul Davies, Klaus Hopt, Richard Nowak and Gerard van
Solinge (eds.) Corporate Boards in Law and Practice: A Comparative Analysis in Europe (Oxford University
Press 2013) 321–22. Germany, therefore, follows the approach proposed by the American Law Institute.
For an analysis of the business judgment rule proposed by the American Law Institute, see Douglas
M. Branson, ‘The Rule that Isn’t a Rule – The Business Judgment Rule’ [2002] 36 Valparaiso University
Law Review 631; Melvin A. Eisenberg, ‘Overview of the Principles of Corporate Governance’ [1993] 48
Business Law 1271.
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with a potential upside. Third, since Markovitz’s seminal work,13 the financial
community is aware of the virtues of diversification. Through diversification,
shareholders not only may reduce their total exposure to risk, but they will
also be able to reduce their natural risk aversion.14 Therefore, diversification
is desirable for the shareholders, since it will encourage them to put their
money in those investment projects with the highest net present value no
matter their volatility.15 Likewise, by reducing the problem of risk aversion,
shareholders will have more incentives to invest in valuable and sometimes
innovative projects, even if they are too risky. Therefore, diversification gener-
ates benefits not only for the shareholders but also for society as a whole.16
In corporations, however, business decisions are not made by share-
holders but by managers.17 And unlike the shareholders, managers do
have incentives to be risk-averse.18 Firstly, their reputation and job may be
at risk if a project (or the company itself) fails. Secondly, if shareholders
are dispersed and rationally apathetic, managers can take advantages of
the asymmetries of information and collective action problems faced by
shareholders; and if so, they may be incentivised to pursue safer but less
profitable projects in order to reduce the risk of being sued.19 After all,
13Harry M. Markovitz, ‘Portfolio Selection’ [1952] 7 The Journal of Finance 77.
14Analysing and testing the problem of risk aversion, see Daniel Bernoulli, ‘Exposition of a New Theory on
the Measurement of Risk’ (English Translation by Louise Sommer) [1954] 22 Econometrica 23; John
W. Pratt, ‘Risk Aversion in the Small and in the Large’ [1964] 32 Econometrica 122; Daniel Kahneman
and Amos Tversky, ‘Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk’ [1979] 47 Econometrica 263.
15John Armour and Jeffrey Gordon, ‘Systematic Harms and Shareholder Value’ [2014] 6 Journal of Legal
Analysis 35, 35–37.
16Other benefits generated by promoting diversification may be associated with the ability to provide
finance to a higher number of business activities. Therefore, diversification may solve an ‘underinvest-
ment problem’.
17There are exceptions in small businesses, or in countries in which shareholders are allowed to give
instructions to the managers even for business decisions.
18Let us suppose that the managers have to choose between two investment projects. The first project
yields a net present value of $100 in case of success, and a net present loss of −$50 in case of
failure. Success and failure may occur with the same probability (50%). The second project yields a
net present value of $20 for sure. Which project will likely be chosen by the managers? In the
absence of any mechanism to reduce the problem of managers’ risk aversion, they will likely prefer
project 2, even though this project may generate an opportunity loss for the shareholders equal to
$5. Indeed, in terms of expected value, the first project will create a net present value equal to
100×0.5 + (−50)×0.5 = $25, while the second project will generate a net present value equal to $20.
Therefore, the first project creates more value for the shareholders. However, as the result of the
problem of managers’ risk aversion, the second project will be probably chosen by the managers.
19This problem has been traditionally associated with the US and, to a lesser extent, UK corporations,
where there is a higher separation between ownership and control. See Rafael La Porta, Florencio
López de Silanes and Robert Vishny, ‘Corporate Ownership Around the World’ [1999] 54 Journal of
Finance 471. Challenging this generally assumed assertion in US corporate law, however, see Clifford
G. Holderness, ‘The Myth of Diffuse Ownership in the United States’ [2009] 44 The Review of Financial
Studies 1377. In any event, the rise of shareholder activism and institutional investors is changing the
ownership structure of many companies around the world. Thus, the traditional ‘Berle-Means’ corpor-
ation has evolved into something different, and therefore the traditional agency costs between man-
agers and shareholders associated with publicly held corporations (especially in the United States
have also changed). Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling, ‘Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behav-
ior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure’ [1976] 3 Journal of Financial Economics 305; John Armour
and Brian Cheffins, ‘The Past, Present and Future of Shareholder Activism by Hedge Funds’ [2012] 37
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the shareholders, under these circumstances, will unlikely be able to know
that the managers invested in a safer but less profitable project. Therefore,
even if stock option plans and other compensation tools may encourage
managers to take more risks, they will still have incentives to be more
risk-averse than diversified shareholders. A conflict of interests between
managers and shareholders may arise then: (i) on the one hand, rational
and diversified shareholders want the managers to pursue more risky pro-
jects, provided that these projects yield higher returns; (ii) on the other
hand, managers have incentives to undertake safer projects, even if they
are less profitable for the shareholders.
There are several ways to reduce the misalignment of incentives poten-
tially existing between managers and shareholders in these situations.20
One of the most successful (or at least most commonly used) methods,
however, not only in the United States but also worldwide has been the
business judgment rule.21 By applying this rule, courts will not second-
guess business decisions, provided that certain conditions are met.22 There-
fore, since managers would be protected from the potential liability associ-
ated with reasonable but unfortunate decisions, not only will there be more
honest and qualified people willing to serve as corporate directors, but they
will also be incentivised to pursue more valuable projects even if they
imply a higher level of risk.
3.2. The ‘institutional problem’ generated by letting judges act as
business decision-makers
A second argument in favour of the business judgment rule is usually associ-
ated with the role of judges as business decision-makers. Namely, this ration-
ale relies on the fact that, even though judges are experts in law, they do not
Journal of Corporation Law 51; John C. Coffee Jr. and Darius Palia, ‘The Impact of Hedge Fund Activism:
Evidence and Implications’ [2014] ECGI – Law Working Paper No. 266/2014; Ronald J. Gilson and Jeffrey
N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance
Rights [2013] 113 Columbia Law Review 863. John Armour and Jeffrey N. Gordon, ‘The Berle-Means Cor-
poration in the Twenty-First Century’ [2008] Working Paper, available at http://www.law.upenn.edu,
accessed 25 January 2017. Aurelio Gurrea Martínez, New Agency Problems: New Legal Rules? Rethinking
Takeover Regulation in the US and Europe, ‘Instituto Iberoamericano de Derecho y Finanzas’ [2016]
Working Paper Series 3 (https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2766208), accessed 23
June 2017.
20See Allen, Kraakman and Subramanian (n 7) 218–36.
21There is a strong connection between law and finance in the context of the business judgment rule. See
Ronald J. Gilson, ‘The Law and Finance of the Business Judgment Rule’, in Arnold W. Sametz and James
L. Bicksler (eds.), The Battle for Corporate Control: Shareholder Rights, Stakeholder Interests, and Manage-
rial Responsibilities (Business One Irwin 1991) 157.
22Although these conditions may differ across jurisdictions, most jurisdictions require that the decision has
to be made in good faith, with no conflict of interest, and in the best interest of the corporation. There-
fore, instead of focusing on the result generated by the decision, the business judgment rule focuses on
the process leading to the decision. These conditions ensure that the business judgment rule neither
creates moral hazard nor acts as a ‘blank check’ for corporate directors.
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usually have enough knowledge of economics, business, and finance.23 More-
over, even if they were trained in these areas, they will unlikely have expertise
in the particular business in which they may have to make a decision. There-
fore, it may seem reasonable that, instead of judging ex post the business
decision made by corporate directors, they should just focus on the process
leading to the decision.24 Furthermore, unlike corporate directors (who can
be removed by the shareholders, so their salary and reputation may be at
risk), courts cannot be ‘punished’ for making a poor business decision, pro-
vided that it is legally sound. Therefore, the use of judges as business
decision-makers may be socially undesirable, taking into account that they
have neither the knowledge nor the incentives to make efficient business
decisions.
3.3. Hindsight bias
The application of the business judgment rule also allows to reduce the so-
called hindsight bias, that is, the inclination, after an event has occurred, to
think that the outcome was predictable, despite the fact that there was no
objective basis for that at the moment of making the decision.25 Hence,
people –and judges are not an exception – tend to bias their judgments in
favour of the outcome. Therefore, as managers will likely be sued only when
a business decision was unsuccessful, the hindsight bias will put the directors
in a worse position than they would have been in a world without this cogni-
tive bias. As a result, it will be easier that the court finds the managers person-
ally liable for a breach of the duty of care, even if the decision was reasonably
made ex ante.26
23Cándido Paz-Ares, ‘La responsabilidad de los administradores como instrumento de gobierno corpora-
tivo’ [2003] 4 Indret, 32; Luca Enriques, ‘Do Corporate Law Judges Matter? Some Evidence from Milan’
[2002] 3 European Business Organization Law Review 756; Easterbrook and Fischel (n 4) 94; Daniel
R. Fischel, ‘The Business Judgment Rule in the Trans Union Case’ [1985] 40 Business Lawyer 1437,
1439–1440.
24Andreas Engert and Susanne Goldlücke, ‘Why agents need discretion: The business judgment rule as
optimal standard of care’ (2013), University of Mannheim, Working Paper, available at http://
goldluecke.vwl.uni-mannheim.de/fileadmin/user_upload/goldluecke/working_papers/BJR2013-01-20.
pdf, accessed 12 February 2017. The authors distinguish between liability for lack of effort in preparing a
risk-taking decision (process due care) and liability for the decision itself (substantive due care). They
argue that as long as courts administer liability in the effort dimension reasonably well, they should
be reluctant to second-guess managerial decisions.
25Emphasizing this argument in the context of the business judgment rule, see Melvin A. Eisenberg, ‘The
Divergence of Standards of Conduct and Standards of Review in Corporate Law’ [1993] 62 Fordham Law
Review 437. For a definition of hindsight bias, see Neal J. Roese and Kathleen D. Vosh, ‘Hindsight Bias’
[2012] 7 Perspectives on Psychological Science 411. See also Baruch Fischhoff, ‘Hindsight ≠ Foresight:
The Effect of Outcome Knowledge on Judgment Under Uncertainty’ [1975] 1 Journal of Experimental
Psychology 288; Daniel Kahneman, Thinking Fast and Slow (Farrar, Straus and Giroux 2011), 202–4.
Baruch Fischhoff, ‘For Those Condemned to Study the Past: Heuristics and Biases in Hindsight’ in
Daniel Kanheman, Paul Slovic and Amos Tversky (eds.), Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and
biases (Cambridge University Press 1982) 325–52.
26See Enriques, Hansmann, and Kraakman (n 7) 79.
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This unfavourable judgment against corporate directors may create
several costs for society. First, it may discourage honest and qualified
people from acting as corporate directors. Second, even if qualified people
accept to act as corporate directors, the shareholders can still be worse
off, since the directors will be incentivised to take a suboptimal level of
risk and/or they will require a higher pay, and these costs will be borne
by the shareholders.
3.4. Certainty
Finally, the implementation of the business judgment rule could also enhance
certainty for both shareholders and managers.27 From the shareholders’ per-
spective, the business judgment rule may allow investors to know ex ante
both the identity and expertise of those people in charge of managing
their wealth. Based on that information, they will be able to adjust their
decisions ex ante. From the directors’ perspective, the business judgment
rule may also promote certainty. Namely, it makes the duty of care more
objective, since the standard of care will not be judged based on some ‘sub-
jective’ conditions assessed by the court, but rather on whether the directors
made the decision based on several requirements known ex ante. Moreover,
the business judgment rule may allow managers to pursue more risky but also
profitable and long-term projects without being worried about short-term
demands.28 In fact, in the absence of the business judgment rule, managers
might be incentivised to pursue safer but less profitable (and perhaps more
short-term) projects, as a way to either preserve their jobs or avoid the risk
of being sued by the shareholders.
4. Problems and limitations
4.1. The underlying assumptions of the business judgment rule
Protecting managers in their business decision may reduce a problem of risk
aversion, and it may ultimately lead to increase value for the shareholders (at a
micro-level perspective) and to promote innovation and growth (at a macro-
level perspective). However, this economic justification for the business judg-
ment rule seems to rely on three underlying assumptions. First, directors are
subject to a credible threat of being sued for a breach of the duty of care.
Second, the primary role of the corporation is to maximise shareholder
value. Third, shareholders are not risk-averse, and therefore they just want
27This argument was used to justify the implementation of a statutory business judgment rule in Australia.
See the Explanatory Memorandum of the Corporate Law Economic Reform Program Bill 1998 (https://
www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2004B00269/Explanatory%20Memorandum/Text).
28See Reading and Co v Trailer Co [1984], decided by the Supreme Court of Delaware.
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the directors to pursue those investment projects with the highest positive
net present value regardless of their volatility.29
Nevertheless, these underlying assumptions are not always valid. Starting
by the first assumption, managers are unlikely be subject to a credible
threat of being sued for a breach of the duty of care in jurisdictions with no
derivate litigation either because of the particular features of the legal
system (e.g. inefficient courts, inexistence of class actions, etc.) or, more
likely, because of the existence of controlling shareholders.30 Indeed, in
countries with controlling shareholders, derivative litigation is usually rare,
since the existence of controlling shareholders reduces agency costs
between managers and shareholders – even though it may generate other
agency problems.31 Moreover, even if the managers (who are usually very
29These latter assumptions can be summarized in Gagliardi v. Trifoods International, Inc., where Chancellor
Allen stated that ‘[… ] Shareholders don’t want (or shouldn’t rationally want) directors to be risk-averse.
Shareholders’ investment interests, across the full range of their diversiﬁable equity investments, will be
maximized if corporate directors and managers honestly assess risk and reward and accept for the cor-
poration the highest risk adjusted returns available that are above the ﬁrm’s cost of capital … But direc-
tors will tend to deviate from this rational acceptance of corporate risk if in authorizing the corporation
to undertake a risky investment, the directors must assume some degree of personal risk relating to ex
post facto claims of derivative liability for any resulting corporate loss’. Likewise, in Joy v North, Judge
Winter stated that ‘[… ] Because potential proﬁt often corresponds to the potential risk, it is very much
in the interest of shareholders that the law not create incentives for overly cautious corporate decisions.
Some opportunities offer great proﬁts at the risk of very substantial losses, while the alternatives offer
less risk of loss but also less potential proﬁt. Shareholders can reduce the volatility of risk by diversifying
their holdings. In the case of the diversiﬁed shareholder, the seemingly more risky alternatives may well
be the best choice since great losses in some stocks will over time be offset by even greater gains in
others. Given mutual funds and similar forms of diversiﬁed investment, courts need not bend over back-
wards to give special protection to shareholders who refuse to reduce the volatility of risk by not diver-
sifying. A rule which penalizes the choice of seemingly riskier alternatives thus may not be in the interest
of shareholders generally’. Therefore, as Armour and Gordon point out, ‘[… ] the structure of corporate
governance arrangements, at least in the USA, is explicitly directed towards encouraging managers to
undertake the highest-NPV projects available to them, regardless of their level of risk [… ]’. See Armour
and Gordon (n 15) 53.
30For an analysis of derivative litigation in the UK and Continental Europe, see Arad Reisberg, Derivative
Actions and Corporate Governance (Oxford University Press 2007); Martin Gelter, ‘Why do Shareholder
Obstacles to Derivative Suits Remain Rare in Continental Europe?’ [2012] ECGI – Law Working Paper
N° 190/2012. For a comparative analysis of derivative litigation in Asia, see Dan W. Puchniak, Harald
Baum and Michael Ewing-Chow (eds.), The Derivative Action in Asia: A Comparative and Functional
Approach (Cambridge University Press 2012). For an empirical analysis of Japanese derivative actions,
arguing that the rise of shareholder activism and the lower cost of filing a lawsuit led to an increase
in derivative litigation, see Curtis J. Milhaupt, ‘A Lost Decade for Japanese Corporate Governance
Reform? What’s Changed, What Hasn’t, and Why’ [2003] Columbia Law and Economics Working
Paper No. 234, 12. A general overview about the situation in Latin America can be found in the
White Paper on Corporate Governance in Latin America prepared by the OCDE in 2003. See also Mierta
Capaul, ‘Corporate Governance in Latin America’ [2003] Whither Latin American Capital Markets, LAC
Regional Study Background Paper, 15–6.
31In jurisdictions with controlling shareholders, the traditional conflict between managers and share-
holders is not generally an issue. Instead, these jurisdictions usually suffer from a problem of ‘tunnelling’
or ‘horizontal agency problems’ in which the controlling shareholder may expropriate minority investors.
See Rafael La Porta, Florencio López de Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny, ‘Law and Finance’
[1998] 106 The Journal of Political Economy 113; Simon Johnson, Rafael La Porta, Florencio López de
Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer, ‘Tunneling’ [2000] 90 The American Economic Review 22; Mark Roe, ‘The
Institutions of Corporate Governance’, in Claude Ménard and Mary M. Shirley (eds.), Handbook of New
Institutional Economics (Kluwer 2005).
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close to the controlling shareholders or they are controlling shareholders
themselves) failed to perform their duties, minority shareholders might not
have incentives to sue the directors, taking into account that most of the
recoveries potentially obtained in a successful lawsuit will go back to the cor-
poration and therefore to the controlling shareholder. Moreover, they may
have to bear some litigation costs. So these factors may discourage derivative
lawsuits.
The second assumption behind the business judgment rule can also be
challenged, due to the fact that in many jurisdictions, the primary role of a cor-
poration is not exclusively identified with the interests of the shareholders but
also with the interest of other stakeholders.32 Therefore, unless the legislator
in these latter jurisdictions consciously decides to switch part of its attention
from the stakeholders to the shareholders, the implementation of the
business judgment rule may achieve an outcome potentially unwanted by a
particular jurisdiction. This circumstance may occur when, instead of conduct-
ing a deep economic analysis of the rule applied to a particular country, the
business judgment rule is implemented just because it is ‘in fashion’ in
other jurisdictions.
Moreover, even if it is assumed that, as a general matter, the primary role of
a corporation in a particular jurisdiction is associated with the maximisation of
shareholder value, this goal should be pursued unless otherwise is provided by
the shareholders.33 In other words, as a corporation is a contract, or at least is
formed by contract, the purpose of this contract should be left to the parties
who initially entered into this contract – that is, the shareholders. Therefore,
the shareholders should be allowed to decide the primary role of the
company either directly (e.g. in the bylaws) or indirectly (e.g. by incorporating
the company in a more ‘stakeholder-oriented’ or ‘shareholder-oriented’ juris-
diction, or, for example, by forming a B corporation). However, defining this
32An example of these jurisdictions can be found in Japan and, to a certain extent, in Germany. For a tra-
ditional discussion about the primary role of a corporation, see Adolf Berle, ‘Corporate Powers as Powers
in Trust’ [1931] 44 Harvard Law Review 1049; E. Merrick Dodd, ‘For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trus-
tees: A Note’ [1932] 45 Harvard Law Review 1365. Summarizing the debate, see William Allen, ‘Our
Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation’ [1992] 14 Cardozo Law Review 261; Mark
J. Roe, ‘The Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm and Industrial Organization’ [2001] 149 University
of Pennsylvania Law Review 2063; William W. Bratton and Michael L. Wachter, ‘Shareholder Primacy’s
Corporatist Origins: Adolf Berle and The Modern Corporation’ [2008] 34 Journal of Corporation Law
99; Martin Gelter, ‘Taming or Protecting the Modern Corporation? Shareholder-Stakeholder Debates
in a Comparative Light’ [2010] ECGI Law Working Paper No. 165/2010; Michael C. Jensen, ‘Value Max-
imization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function’ [2002] 12 Business Ethics Quarterly
135.
33Jonathan R. Macey, Corporate Governance: Promises Kept, Promises Broken (Princeton University Press
2008) 2. This is also consistent with the decision of the US Supreme Court in Hobby Lobby, holding
that corporate law does not mandate that business corporations limit themselves to pursuit of profit
but rather to pursue any lawful purpose decided by the shareholders in the charters. This lawful
purpose may consist of the maximization of shareholder value, the maximization of the interests of a
specified group of stakeholders, or – if the shareholders want to give a blank check to the managers
– the maximization of the interests of ‘society’ by letting the managers decide what is best for society.
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objective may be costly, not only for the collective action problems associated
with coordinating shareholders’ actions and preferences but also because it
will be difficult to define a specified corporate goal other than the maximisa-
tion of the value of the firm. For this reason, it seems desirable to assume, as a
default rule, that the primary goal of a corporation is to maximise the value of
the firm.34
The third underlying assumption of the business judgment rule is identified
with an old idea existing in corporate law and finance: shareholders are not
risk-averse, due to their variable returns, their limited liability, and their
ability to hold diversified portfolios. Therefore, they just want the managers
to pursue those projects with the highest net present value no matter their
volatility.35 This rigid assumption can also be challenged, since many corpor-
ations may have non-diversified shareholders. Namely, even though non-
diversified shareholders can be found in any company or jurisdiction, it will
be more common to find non-diversified shareholders in jurisdictions with
many family businesses, concentrated ownership structures, and underdeve-
loped capital markets.36 In these countries, as the shareholders might not be
fully diversified, they might want the directors to be risk-averse. In other
words, they will care about the volatility of an investment project. Thus, the
implementation of the business judgment rule may exacerbate the misalign-
ment of incentives potentially existing between managers and
shareholders.37
Hence, when deciding about the implementation of the business judg-
ment rule in a particular jurisdiction, the legislator should assess whether
34Arguing that firms should maximize shareholder welfare and not market value, see Oliver Hart and Luigi
Zingales, ‘Companies Should Maximize Shareholder Welfare Not Market Value’ [2017] 2 Journal of Law,
Finance, and Accounting 247.
35Arguing that this is one of the most important ideas in modern corporate governance, see Armour and
Gordon (n 15) 51–52.
36For the relation between family businesses, concentrated ownership structures, and lack of appropriate
diversification, see Gouchang Zhang, ‘Ownership Concentration, Risk Aversion and the Effect of Financial
Structure on Investment Decisions’ [1998] 42 European Economic Review 1751; Enrico M. Cervellati, Pier-
paolo Pattitoni and Marco Savioli, ‘Entrepreneurial Under-Diversification: Over Optimism and Overcon-
fidence’ [2013] Riemini Centre for Economic Analysis. Working Paper 9; Teodora Paligorova, ‘Corporate
Risk Taking and Ownership Structure’ [2010] Bank of Canada Working Paper 2010/3; Ronald C. Anderson
and David Reeb, ‘Founding-Family Ownership, Corporate Diversification, and Firm Leverage’ [2003] 46
Journal of Law and Economics 653; Mara Faccio, Maria Marchica and Roberto Mura, ‘Large Shareholder
Diversification and Corporate Risk-Taking’ [2011] 24 Review of Financial Studies 3601; Alexander Dyck
and Luigi Zingales, ‘Private Benefits of Control: An International Comparison’ [2004] 59 The Journal of
Finance 537; Sabri Boubaker, Pascal Nguyen and Wael Rouatbi, ‘Multiple large shareholders and corpor-
ate risk-taking: Evidence from French family firms’ [2016] European Financial Management (forthcom-
ing). However, the situation is quite different in countries with concentrated ownership structures
where the blockholders are not families but institutional investors. In these situations, this assumption
might not apply, since these institutional investors will probably be diversified. Recent studies show
that many US corporations respond to this model. See Gilson and Gordon (n 19); Armour and Gordon
(n 19).
37Showing other unintended costs created by the implementation of the business judgment rule (at least
as a codified rule), see Jenifer Varzaly, ‘Protecting the Authority of Directors: An Empirical Analysis of the
Statutory Business Judgment Rule’ [2012] 12 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 429.
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the shareholders generally existing in that country may be more or less risk-
averse. Since this is a difficult assessment, the legislator should look at
other variables that may provide some indicia about the level of risk aversion
potentially desired by the shareholders existing in a particular jurisdiction. For
instance, it could be relevant to analyse the development of capital markets
in a particular country, as well as the level of concentration of share owner-
ship and the type of investors holding shares. In countries with more devel-
oped capital markets, it will be easier for investors to hold diversified
portfolios. Likewise, in countries with concentrated ownership structures, it
seems relevant to determine whether the existence of blockholders is due
to the presence of family businesses or, by contrast, to institutional inves-
tors.38 In the former case, there will be reasons to believe that the share-
holders might not be diversified – or, at least, fully diversified – since most
of their wealth (including human capital) will likely be invested in the
family business. Therefore, the interest of the shareholders will likely be
more aligned with the interest of the directors, since none of them will
have incentives to bear a high level of risk.39 In these circumstances, the
application of the business judgment rule may not be desirable, since it
may encourage the managers to bear a level of risk that might not be
desired by the shareholders. Therefore, even though – as it will be explained
below – non-diversified controlling shareholders may decide not to
implement the business judgment rule (assuming that this decision is left
to the company, rather than being imposed by the legislator as a mandatory
rule) the business judgment rule may exacerbate the misalignment of incen-
tives potentially existing between managers and shareholders.40 The situ-
ation, however, may be quite different in countries where blockholders are
institutional investors. In these circumstances, as the shareholders will likely
38The United Kingdom and the United States are good examples of jurisdictions with institutional inves-
tors. Therefore, the business judgment rule may work best in these jurisdictions, since this type of inves-
tors are usually diversified. For an analysis of the evolution of share ownership in the United Kingdom
and the United States, see John Armour and David Skeel, ‘Who Should Write Hostile Takeovers, and
Why? The Peculiar Divergence of US and UK Takeover Regulation’ [2007] 95 Georgetown Law Journal
1727. For the United States, see Gilson and Gordon (n 19). For an international survey of family business
groups around the world, see Ronald W. Masulis, Peter K. Pham, and Jason Zein, ‘Family Business Groups
around the World: Financing Advantages, Control Motivations and Organizational Choices’ [2011] 24
Review of Financial Studies 3556.
39While shareholders of family businesses may have incentives to be risk-averse because most of their
wealth will be invested in the family business, managers will have incentives to be risk-averse as a
result of the fear of losing their jobs, salaries, and private benefits of control.
40Emphasizing the role of corporate law in the alignment of incentives between managers and investors,
see Klaus Hopt, ‘Comparative Corporate Governance: The State of the Art and International Regulation’
[2011] 59 American Journal of Comparative Law 1; Jonathan R. Macey, Corporate Governance: Promises
Kept, Promises Broken (Princeton University Press 2008); Jensen and Meckling (n 19). As it will be dis-
cussed below, though, this misalignment of incentives will not be that relevant in countries with con-
centrated ownership structures. In these countries, the primary conflict potentially existing when
implementing the business judgment rule may arise between the controlling shareholder (that may
prefer the business judgment rule or not depending on the level of diversification of its own portfolio)
and some minority shareholders.
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be diversified, the implementation of the business judgment rule may make
more sense.
In countries with controlling shareholders, the business judgment rule
will likely be adopted only if the controlling shareholder is diversified, or
the controlling shareholder also acts as a corporate director. By contrast,
if the controlling shareholder is not diversified, the business judgment
rule will unlikely be implemented, even if the minority shareholders hold
diversified portfolios and therefore have more appetite for risk. This situ-
ation, then, may generate a conflict among shareholders. Namely, it may
lead to a type of opportunism of controlling shareholders vis-à-vis minority
shareholders, since the former may have incentives to implement the
business judgment rule only when it can be beneficial for their own
portfolio.
One possible solution to address this potential conflict among share-
holders could consist of prohibiting controlling shareholders from voting
when deciding about the implementation (or non-application) of the
business judgment rule in the bylaws. Nevertheless, as this rule would
indirectly prohibit controlling shareholders from choosing their preferences
in terms of risk and returns, it could discourage many investors from finan-
cing corporations as controlling shareholders. Therefore, this solution may
harm the development of capital markets and, more generally, firms’
access to finance.
A more desirable solution to protect minority investors may consist of
requiring companies with the business judgment rule in place to disclose
this information not only in the bylaws but also in other corporate documents,
such as the notes to the financial statements. Thus, by providing an enhanced
disclosure of this information potentially relevant for the shareholders, the pro-
tection of minority shareholders can be improved. Moreover, as the control-
ling shareholder will likely seek to raise external finance, this enhanced
disclosure will also incentivise controlling shareholders to choose the most
efficient solution (that is, implementing or not the business judgment rule).
Therefore, the interest of the controlling shareholders will be relatively
aligned with the interests of minority investors.
4.2. Other weaknesses of the business judgment rule
It was argued that the fact of letting judges act as ultimate business
decision-makers may create several problems such as hindsight bias and
the so-called institutional problem. However, these problems may exist in
almost every situation in which a court has to decide a case.41 Indeed,
41As stated by Easterbrook and Fischel, traditional explanations for the business judgment rule such as the
lack of competence of judges in making business decisions provide helpful but not sufficient arguments
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when a judge has to decide about an aircraft crash due to technical pro-
blems, the judge does not probably have any expertise in aerospace engin-
eering. Moreover, it also has to decide ex post. So the institutional problem
and the hindsight bias also exist in these cases. Therefore, these arguments
do not seem to be powerful enough to support the implementation of the
business judgment rule.42
Finally, the argument that the business judgment rule may enhance cer-
tainty for both investors and directors does not seem very convincing
either. From the perspective of investors, judges can be seen as ultimate
decision-makers. Moreover, since investors may infer which particular
court will be competent to decide a case based on the company’s place
of incorporation or, if so, the company’s real seat, they will also be able
to adjust ex ante the quality of the court. Therefore, it is not clear that,
in the absence of the business judgment rule, investors will be exposed
to higher uncertainty.
Likewise, from the perspective of corporate directors and the risky, valu-
able, and long-term projects that they may pursue under the protection of
the business judgment rule, some concerns may also arise. On the one
hand, it is not clear that preventing judges from second-guessing business
decisions may encourage directors to pursue long-term value. On the other
hand, even if it does so, this outcome can also be achieved in a better way
to justify the rule. As these authors point out, these arguments do not explain ‘[… ] why the same
judges who decide whether engineers have designed the compressors on jet engines properly,
whether the farmer delivered pomegranates conforming to the industry’s specifications, and whether
the prison system adversely affects the mental states of prisoners cannot decide whether a manager
diligently failed to sack a subordinate who made improvident loans [… ]’. See Easterbrook and
Fischel (n 4) 94. Actually, while judges do not usually have any knowledge or expertise in topics such
as medicine or engineering (and they make decisions on these issues), they are starting to get training
in economics, business, and finance in many jurisdictions. For example, in Spain, judges specialized in
commercial matters have to prove some training in economics, accounting, and finance before being
appointed to a commercial court. In the United States, many judges such as Frank H. Easterbrook
and Richard Posner have a deep knowledge of economics and finance. In Colombia, the former
judge in charge of solving corporate disputes at the Superintendence of Companies, Dr José Miguel
Mendoza, has a PhD in law and finance.
42In my opinion, however, there is a more plausible explanation for letting judges review non-business
decisions. As pointed out in this paper, one of the most powerful arguments to support the implemen-
tation of the business judgment rule is that it may reduce the problem of managers’ risk aversion. There-
fore, it may promote risk-taking and the maximization of the value of the firm. Moreover, by doing so,
the business judgment rule may also create a positive externality for society: the promotion of inno-
vation and development. Nevertheless, the same argument might not apply to other fields (such as
engineering, architecture, or medicine) in which a judge also has to second-guess decisions. For engin-
eers, architects, or doctors, society, under some circumstances, society can be better off if these actors
act more conservatively. In other words, while taking risks may create value in the context of business
decisions, a higher level of risk-taking when an engineer builds a bridge, a doctor operates a patient, or
an architect designs a skyscraper may create some negative externalities. Therefore, while it may be
socially desirable to prevent judges from second-guessing business decisions as a way to promote
risk-taking, innovation, and development, it may be justified to review decisions potentially made by
engineers, doctors, or architects. An alternative hypothesis, however, could be simply that the lobby
of corporate directors has been more influential than the lobby of other professions, such as doctors,
engineers, or architects.
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through many other devices such as executive compensation based on long-
term performance. Therefore, this argument in favour of the business judg-
ment rule is relatively weak.
5. The implementation of the business judgment rule
5.1. Are the managers subject to a credible threat of being sued for a
breach of the duty of care?
Despite the benefits generally associated with the business judgment rule,
this legal device might not even be needed in a particular jurisdiction to
protect corporate directors in their business decisions. Namely, the business
judgment rule might not be necessary in jurisdictions where directors are
not subject to a credible threat of being sued for a potential breach of the
duty of care. And this situation will likely occur in countries with no derivative
litigation either because it is not incentivised from a procedural perspective or
because of the presence of controlling shareholders.
5.2. Unintended costs created by implementing the business
judgment rule
If the managers are not subject to a credible threat of being sued, the legis-
lator should think twice about the effects and desirability of implementing
the business judgment rule. Namely, it should take into account that, while
the business judgment rule might not create a clear gain, it may generate
some costs.
On the one hand, the implementation of the business judgment rule may
actually increase, rather than decrease, the number of lawsuits associated with
a breach of the duty of care. Indeed, since the protection of the business judg-
ment rule is usually granted only when directors make their business decision
in line with certain requirements,43 the shareholders will have the ability to
challenge the decision when the directors fail to satisfy any of these require-
ments. And as some of these requirements may imply a certain degree of sub-
jectivity (e.g. ‘good faith’, ‘reasonable’ level of information, etc.), the
implementation of the business judgment rule may actually increase the
level of litigation against corporate directors, especially in countries in
which the business judgment rule has not been implemented as a ‘presump-
tion’ (as it is understood under Delaware law) but as a ‘safe harbour’ (as it is
shaped in Germany). Under this scenario, the implementation of the business
43This aspect will depend on whether the business judgment rule is implemented as a presumption in
favour of corporate directors (as it is applied under Delaware law) or as a ‘safe harbour’ (as it is
applied, for example, in Germany). In the former case, the burden of proof will be on the plaintiff,
while the directors will bear the burden of proof in jurisdictions where the business judgment rule is
implemented as a ‘safe harbour’ for corporate directors.
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judgment rule may actually increase uncertainty for corporate directors.44 As a
result, not only would they be subject to a threat that did not exist before, but,
perhaps more importantly, value can be destroyed for the shareholders and
society as a whole, since many honest and qualified people can be discour-
aged from acting as corporate directors; or if they do so, it would be at a
higher cost for the corporation.
On the other hand, the implementation of the business judgment rule may
encourage directors to make ‘over-informed’ business decisions, as a way to
make sure that they will be fully protected in case of a potential lawsuit.
This situation may lead to two potential costs. First, it may make the
decision-making process more inefficient and time-consuming, even for
non-material business decisions. Second, and more importantly, the directors
may have incentives to ‘over-request’ expert opinions – paid by the share-
holders – due to the fact that a higher level of information will put the direc-
tors in a better position in case a court reviews whether they met the
conditions generally required to enjoy the protection of the business judg-
ment rule. So the implementation of the business judgment rule may end
up making the shareholders as a whole worse off.
5.3. How should the business judgment rule be implemented?
Let us assume that, needed or not, a jurisdiction decides to implement the
business judgment rule. In these situations, there are several ways in which
the rule can be implemented: (i) statutory (or codified) rule vs. non-statutory
rule; (ii) mandatory rule vs. default rule; (iii) opt-in rule vs. opt-out rule; and
(iv) as a presumption in favour of corporate directors vs. as a ‘safe harbour’. Like-
wise, and especially in jurisdictions in which directors owe fiduciary duties to
corporate creditors even outside of insolvency, the legislator should also con-
sider how the business judgment rule may affect creditors.
Regarding the first aspect, it seems more reasonable to implement the
business judgment rule as a codified rule in jurisdictions where managers
have not been traditionally protected in their business decisions.45 This argu-
ment will be even stronger in civil law countries, where court decisions are not
formally considered a source of law. Therefore, the implementation of the
business judgment rule as a codified rule will make more sense in civil law
countries with no tradition of protecting managers in their business decisions.
That does not mean that a common law jurisdiction should not implement a
44This actually seems to be the case in Australia. For an excellent empirical analysis of the implementation
of the business judgment rule in Australia, and how the rule generated some unintended costs, see
Jenifer Varzaly, ‘Protecting the Authority of Directors: An Empirical Analysis of the Statutory Business
Judgment Rule’ [2012] 12 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 429. This study shows that the statutory
business judgment rule did not achieve one of the primary purposes of the Australian legislator: to
enhance legal certainty and protect corporate directors in their business decisions.
45Eisenberg (n 10).
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codified business judgment rule. In fact, it might make sense to do so if the
authority of directors is not clearly protected by courts (as it seemed to
happen in Australia and, to some extent, in California). But the case for imple-
menting the business judgment rule as a codified rule will be even stronger in
civil law countries without a clear case law protecting managers in their
business decisions.
The second step should consist of deciding whether the business judg-
ment rule should be implemented as a default rule or as a mandatory rule.
As a general matter, most provisions in corporate law are (or should be)
default rules, due to the contractual nature of the corporation. Indeed, as
it was mentioned, corporations are, or at least are formed by, contracts.
Therefore, unless a potential ‘market failure’ occurs,46 shareholders should
be allowed to set up the terms that regulate the relationship between all
the parties involved in the corporate contract (mainly the relationship
between managers and shareholders, and the shareholders among them-
selves). Otherwise, they might be discouraged from either entering into
(ex ante) or ‘joining’ (ex post) these contracts, which basically means that
they would have less incentives to form and finance business enterprises.
Mandatory rules, then, are (or should be) the exception in corporate law. In
the context of the business judgment rule, it could be argued that the asym-
metries of information, collective action problems, or even lack of diversifica-
tion faced bymany shareholders may act as a ‘market failure’ that may justify a
mandatory response by the legislator. Moreover, as the business judgment
rule may also create a positive externality in society (e.g. innovation, diversifi-
cation, and development), from a macroeconomic perspective, it may seem
desirable to impose the business judgment rule as a mandatory rule.
However, there are reasons to be sceptical about these arguments. First, in
countries with controlling shareholders and concentrating ownership struc-
tures (i.e. most countries around the world), the aforementioned market fail-
ures might not exist, or their magnitude might be too small to justify this
regulatory intervention. Indeed, in countries with concentrated ownership
structures, it will be relatively easy to coordinate shareholders’ actions. So
this market failure will not be a big issue.47 And even if a jurisdiction has tra-
ditionally had dispersed ownership (as the United Kingdom and the United
46Jeffrey N. Gordon, ‘The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law’ [1989] 89 Columbia Law Review 1549;
Melvin A. Eisenberg, ‘The Structure of Corporate Law’ [1989] 89 Columbia Law Review 1461; Michael
J. Trebilcock, The Limits of Freedom of Contract (Harvard University Press 1993). As pointed out by
Armour, Kraakman and Hansmann, mandatory terms may also serve a useful standardization function,
in circumstances (such as accounting rules) where the benefits of compliance increase if everyone
adheres to the same provision. See John Armour, Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, ‘What is Cor-
porate Law?’ in Kraakman et al, The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional Approach
(3rd edn, Oxford University Press 2009) 22.
47For a survey of corporate ownership structures around the world, see La Porta, López de Silanes, and
Vishny (n 19).; Mara Faccio and Larry H. Lang, ‘The Ultimate Ownership of Western European Corporations’
[2002] 65 Journal of Financial Economics 365; and Stijn Claessens, Simeon Djankov and Larry H.P. Lang,
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States), and therefore some of these problems might exist, the rise of share-
holders activism and the concentration of share ownership in the hands of
institutional investors has also reduced this ‘market failure’.48 Second, even
if, from a macroeconomic perspective, the legislator may want to promote
innovation, diversification, and shareholder wealth, the implementation of
the business judgment rule as a mandatory rule might not be the best way
to do so. In fact, it could generate the opposite result if the legislator ends
up imposing a solution potentially unwanted by many shareholders. In
these circumstances, many shareholders (especially non-diversified share-
holders) would be discouraged from investing in a corporation, since these
investments might not meet their preferences in terms of risks and returns.
Therefore, the imposition of the business judgement rule may harm the devel-
opment of capital markets and firms’ ability to raise capital. For these reasons,
the optimal way to implement the business judgment rule should be as a
default rule.
The third key question to be asked when deciding about the implemen-
tation of the business judgment rule should turn into the design of the
default rule. Namely, the legislator should decide what is best to maximise
both the advantages associated with the business judgment rule (discussed
in section 3) and the general benefits associated with default rules, that is:
(i) to reduce contracting costs by providing what most shareholders would
have probably bargained ex ante49; and (ii) to serve as ‘informational penal-
ties’ for parties with superior information who may want to alter the default.50
In my opinion, this question should be answered, once again, according to
the primary role of the corporation and the level of risk aversion potentially
characterising most shareholders in a particular jurisdiction. In jurisdictions
with more diversified shareholders (usually because of the existence of insti-
tutional investors and developed capital markets), and/or jurisdictions where
the primary role of the corporation is to maximise shareholder value, it makes
more sense to implement the business judgment rule as an opt-out rule.
Therefore, the rule should apply unless shareholders state otherwise.51 By
contrast, in jurisdictions with more non-diversified shareholders (usually
because of the existence of many family businesses, non-developed capital
markets, and non-sophisticated investors), and/or in which the primary role
‘The Separation of Ownership and Control in East Asian Corporations’ [2000] 58 Journal of Financial Econ-
omics 81.
48Explaining how the rise of shareholder activism and the concentration of share ownership in the hands
of institutional investors are changing the traditional agency problems existing in large corporations in
the United States and Europe, see Gilson and Gordon (n 19) and Gurrea-Martínez (n 19).
49Easterbrook and Fischel (n 4) 34–5.
50Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner, ‘Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default
Rules’ [1989] 99 Yale Law Journal 87; Yair Listokin, ‘What do Corporate Default Rules and Menu Do?
An Empirical Examination’ [2009] 6 Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 279.
51This option would not be possible in countries with a non-statutory business judgment rule, since the
shareholders have nothing to say about the way a rule is interpreted by courts.
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of the corporation is not generally identified with the maximisation of share-
holder value, it makes more sense to implement the business judgment rule
as an opt-in rule.
A fourth aspect to assess when implementing the business judgment rule
should consist of whether, following the German approach, the rule is
designed as a ‘safe harbour’ or, by contrast, as a presumption in favour of cor-
porate directors like in Delaware.52 The Delaware rule, compared to the
German rule, may reduce the level of litigation, since the plaintiff will have
fewer incentives to file a lawsuit. In countries with more powerful minority
shareholders (like in the United States and the United Kingdom, as a result
of the wide presence of institutional investors), or jurisdictions in which
derivative suits can easily be exercised, it might make sense to impose the
burden of proof on the plaintiff. Nevertheless, in countries with more retail
investors, and/or in which the use of derivative actions is not quite
common, it would seem more desirable to follow the German approach
and thereby impose the burden of proof on the directors.
A final aspect to consider when implementing the business judgment rule
(especially, in jurisdictions in which corporate directors also owe fiduciary
duties toward creditors, even outside the zone of insolvency) is how the
rule is going to affect creditors. In the case of ‘adjusting creditors’,53 that is,
creditors with the ability to adjust the terms of their contracts (typically soph-
isticated lenders), no special protection should be provided by the legislator.
Markets forces will encourage shareholders to decide what is best for the cor-
poration. For that purpose, while the business judgment rule may encourage
risk taking, and therefore it may lead to more value-creating projects for the
shareholders, the decision to adapt the rule will also depend on the potential
reaction of the company’s lenders. If the lenders perceive that the business
judgment rule may lead to more risky projects (increasing the likelihood of
default) or it may reduce the variety of legal actions potentially exercised
by the creditors to enforce their claims, the lenders may respond with an
increase in the cost of debt. And if so, the shareholders may be incentivised
to opt out of the rule in order to have better access to finance.54 Therefore,
with regard to ‘adjusting creditors’, the adoption of the business judgment
rule should not be an issue. The market will create private incentives to
achieve an optimal outcome.
52See Roth (n 7) 321–2.
53For an analysis of the concept of ‘adjusting’ and ‘non-adjusting’ creditors, see Lucian A. Bebchuk and
Jesse M. Fried, ‘The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy’ [1996] 105 Yale
Law Journal 857; and Lucian A. Bebchuk and Jesse M. Fried, ‘The Uneasy Case for the Priority of
Secured Claims in Bankruptcy: Further Thoughts and A Reply to Critics’ [1997] 82 Cornell Law Review
1279.
54Under this scenario, the shareholders should have to balance the potential benefits of the business judg-
ment rule (e.g. innovation, higher returns, etc.) with its potential costs (e.g. lower access to finance and
other unintended costs for shareholders).
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The problem arises when dealing with ‘non-adjusting creditors’55 (e.g. tort
claimant), especially when the company has decided to implement (or ‘opt in’)
the business judgment rule. In these circumstances, sophisticated lenders
should not be allowed to exercise a direct claim for a breach of the duty of
care, provided that the directors fulfil the conditions generally required to
be protected in their business decisions. Nevertheless, unless other alternative
devices are implemented to protect non-adjusting creditors (e.g. insurance,
priority in bankruptcy, unlimited liability of shareholders toward these credi-
tors, etc.), this type of non-sophisticated creditors should be allowed to sue
the managers for a potential breach of the duty of care, even if the business
judgment rule is adopted.56 Therefore, if the directors harm a particular
non-adjusting creditor while making a business decision, the creditor
should preserve its right to exercise a direct action against the directors.
The situation should differ, however, when the harm is not directly generated
to a particular non-adjusting creditor but to the corporation itself. In these cases,
some countries allow creditors, under certain conditions,57 to file derivative
actions against corporate directors. In these circumstances, and consistently
with the argument mentioned above, non-adjusting creditors would preserve
their right to sue for a breach of the duty of care even if the business judgment
rule has been adopted. In the case of sophisticated lenders, however, the situ-
ation should change with respect to what it has been argued with regard to
direct claims. Indeed, when it comes to derivative actions, it should be kept in
mind that the company’s creditors sue the managers on behalf of the corpor-
ation. Therefore, the recoveries potentially obtained from the managers
would not go to the creditors themselves but to the company’s assets. Thus,
by limiting the right to sue only to non-adjusting creditors, the legislator
would actually decrease, rather than increase, the protection of non-adjusting
creditors. For this reason, in derivative actions, sophisticated lenders should
have the right to sue, even if the business judgment rule is in place.
Finally, it cannot be forgotten that the business judgment rule only pro-
tects corporate directors from business decisions. Therefore, even if a creditor
has the right to sue (as it has been proposed for non-adjusting creditors exer-
cising direct claims, and any creditor filing a derivative action), the court should
make sure that the harm inflicted by the directors is a causal consequence of a
55Lucian A. Bebchuk and Jesse M. Fried, ‘The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy’
[1996] 105 Yale Law Journal 857.
56It is unclear that corporate law should be the right place to protect non-adjusting creditors. Moreover,
even if it is the most efficient place to do so, it does not seem to be very effective. For this reason, some
authors have proposed a variety of devices to protect non-adjusting creditors outside of corporate law.
See Allen, Kraakman and Subramanian (n 7) 151. Proposing unlimited liability of shareholders toward
tort claimants, see Reinier Kraakman and Henry Hansmann, ‘Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability
for Corporate Torts’ [1991] 100 Yale Law Journal 1879.
57These conditions may include a situation of insolvency. In these situations, as the creditors become the
‘residual claimants’ of the firm, they may have the right to sue the directors for a breach of fiduciary
duties, provided that the shareholders do not do so.
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business decision. And this is not always the case, especially when it refers to
non-adjusting creditors exercising a direct claim.
6. Conclusions
Many jurisdictions have implemented, or are planning to implement, the
business judgment rule as a way to improve their corporate governance
practices. However, despite the benefits generally associated with the
business judgment rule, this article argues that several circumstances may
make this rule potentially undesirable for some corporations, especially
outside the United States. It has been argued that the business judgment
rule, as it has been traditionally understood, seems to be based on three
underlying assumptions. First, directors are subject to a credible threat of
being sued for a potential breach of the duty of care. Second, the primary
role of the corporation is to maximise shareholder value. Third, due to
several factors (e.g. limited liability, variable returns, and portfolio diversifica-
tion), shareholders are not risk-averse, and therefore they just want the
directors to pursue those projects with the highest net present value regard-
less of their volatility.
However, these underlying assumptions might not be held in some juris-
dictions outside the United States, and even with respect to many US corpor-
ations (e.g. family businesses or B corporations). Moreover, many corporations
may require, depending on their stage or type of business, a more or less risky
investment strategy. Therefore, the application of the business judgment rule
may encourage the directors to bear a level of risk that, in some circum-
stances, might not be desired by the shareholders. In addition, the implemen-
tation of the business judgment rule may create other unintended costs for
the shareholders, such as those generated by ‘over-requesting’ expert
opinions.
In my opinion, the most efficient way to implement (if so) the business
judgment rule in a particular jurisdiction will depend, among other factors,
on the corporate ownership structure prevailing in the country, the level
the enforcement of the duty of care, the type of investors and capital
markets existing in a particular jurisdiction, the quality of courts, and the
primary role of a corporation. In any case, it has been argued that, even if
the business judgment rule is implemented, its application should be
decided at a firm-level. Namely, it has been suggested that the business judg-
ment rule should be implemented as an opt-out rule in jurisdictions where the
primary role of the corporation is the maximisation of shareholder value,
investors are usually diversified (normally because of the existence of insti-
tutional investors and developed capital markets), the quality of courts may
be low in terms of either independence or expertise, and/or directors are
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subject to a credible threat of being sued for a potential breach of the duty of
care (usually as a result of a higher level of derivative litigation).
By contrast, it has been proposed that the business judgment rule should
be implemented as an opt-in rule (that is, a rule that will not apply, unless the
shareholders decide otherwise) in jurisdictions where shareholders are not
generally diversified (usually, as the result of the existence of many family
businesses, non-developed capital markets, and non-sophisticated share-
holders), the primary role of the corporation is not exclusively associated
with the maximisation of shareholder value, the quality of courts is relatively
high in terms of both independence and expertise, and/or directors are not
subject to a credible threat of being sued for a potential breach of the duty
of care (normally because of the lack of derivative litigation).
And while some factors justifying the implementation of the business judg-
ment rule as an opt-in rule will be found in countries exhibiting features that
may suggest the implementation of the business judgment rule as an opt-out
rule and the other way around, this article provides guidance on where, how
and why the business judgment rule may make more or less sense.
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